Bridging the Bosphorus: How Europe and Turkey can flip tiffs into ways within the Black Sea

Abstract

• Turkey and Russia are the dominant powers within the Black Sea. They preserve a fragile stability of competitors and cooperation as every seeks to include the opposite but additionally to keep away from triggering a conflict.
• Turkey’s cautious method in direction of Russia has led it to prioritise regional stability over alignment with EU and NATO insurance policies, straining relations with the West.
• As Europe faces shifting US insurance policies and the problem of containing a post-war Russia, renewed cooperation with Turkey is important. The Black Sea may very well be step one.
• NATO ought to prioritise mini-partnerships with Ankara within the Black Sea, utilizing Turkey’s desire for regional cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria over high-profile engagements with non-coastal allies.
• The EU ought to foster collaboration in areas of mutual curiosity—resembling Black Sea safety, Caucasus stability and defence-industrial cooperation—to enhance its relations with Turkey.
• A practical reset in Turkey-EU relations might improve all sides’s skill to include Russia, a shared purpose, and embrace Turkey within the post-Ukraine conflict European safety structure.

“It’s sophisticated”

“Our Black Sea” was how Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan described it when he visited his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in September 2023. The assembly would revive a deal that allowed embattled Ukraine to export grain and different commodities from its Black Sea ports.

The remark might have been an acknowledgment of a political actuality: Turkey and Russia are the dominant gamers within the Black Sea. The ocean can be central to Putin’s nice energy ambitions. Russia has traditionally used it as a launchpad for its imperial energy projections and to guard its southern flank earlier than its armies can transfer in direction of jap Europe or the Caucasus. It is usually Russia’s shortest path to the nice and cozy waters of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. However Turkey has the longest coast within the Black Sea and controls entry to the Mediterranean by way of the Turkish straits: the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The 1936 Montreux Conference granted Turkey the authority to manage naval entry to the Black Sea by way of the straits—placing to relaxation a recurrent level of rivalry that helped trigger almost a dozen wars with Russia within the previous couple of centuries.

The Black Sea is the southern entrance of the Ukraine conflict and Ukraine’s solely outlet to the excessive seas—a lifeline for its financial and army survival as an unbiased and sovereign nation. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ankara invoked the Montreux Conference to shut the straits to the warships of “belligerent powers”. Regardless of an exception that enables Black-Sea-based warships to return to their dwelling ports after the closure (together with Russia’s and Ukraine’s), Turkey went additional, closing the Turkish straits to army vessels of all international locations—Russian, Ukrainian or NATO. This left Russia unable to bolster its Black Sea Fleet, which grew to become susceptible to Ukrainian assaults. However it additionally meant NATO warships from non-coastal states couldn’t enter the Black Sea to assist Ukraine. This demonstrates the balancing act Turkey has maintained: supporting Ukraine with out triggering a NATO-Russia escalation off its shores.

The truth is, for the reason that finish of the chilly conflict, Turkey has been cautious to keep away from grandstanding within the Black Sea that might provoke Russia. However, on the similar time, it has been cautious of Russian ambitions to dominate the area and has used a containment technique the place it might. Russia, for its half, goals to: stop Turkey from stifling it within the Black Sea; drive a wedge so far as potential between Ankara and its Western companions; and cease it from gaining extra energy within the area. This delicate balancing act types the premise of their kabuki dance of competitors and cooperation—or “co-opetition”.

Their uncommon relationship has raised eyebrows within the West. Turkey confronted criticism in Europe for bucking European sanctions towards Russia after the latter annexed Crimea in 2014, after which once more after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Not solely that, however over the previous decade Turkey has additionally developed shut financial relations with Russia.

Turkey’s nearer relations with Russia coincided with its drift from the West. For a lot of the previous decade, EU officers noticed Turkey as a big strategic problem and centered extra on containing its assertive insurance policies than on determining a option to interact with this regional heavyweight. Europeans had an extended record of complaints when it got here to Turkish coverage in Syria and Libya, in addition to within the jap Mediterranean, the place Turkey has flexed its muscle in maritime disputes with Greece and Cyprus in what European critics have referred to as gunboat diplomacy.

There was no love misplaced on the Turkish aspect, both. European weapons embargoes towards Turkey in response to its operations in Syria from February 2015 onwards irritated Turkish policymakers. Turkish politicians additionally deplored the weak European response to the 2016 coup try in Turkey and its aftermath. They typically believed that some EU member states had been actively undermining Turkey’s ascendance and regional affect. This created, on the very least, suspicion towards European intentions in Turkey. The Turkish public typically agreed however stored supporting an EU future for Turkey.

However three years of conflict in Ukraine have created a brand new actuality for each Europe and Turkey. The battle has highlighted the existential menace from a revisionist Russia and the breakdown of the rules-based order. The Trump administration’s rush to strike a cope with the Kremlin, even within the absence of safety ensures for Ukraine, additionally raises questions on the way forward for transatlantic unity and European safety. Whereas unwilling to impress Moscow, Ankara is now additionally apprehensive concerning the return of a revanchist foe. A Russia that perceives itself as victorious would reinforce Moscow’s expansionist ambitions, rising the chance of aggression towards Moldova, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, or Poland. It could additionally solid doubt on the European skill to discourage Russian aggression.

European NATO allies and Turkey would profit from deepening their cooperation to include Russia within the Black Sea and to safe Ukraine’s future. This paper units out how they need to do that. It additionally outlines how Black Sea cooperation by way of NATO might grow to be a bridge for the EU to restore its ties with Turkey, with a view to a wider European-Turkish defence partnership sooner or later.  

Shifting energy within the Black Sea

“An astounding ten wars have taken place on or close to the Black Sea littoral for the reason that finish of the Chilly Conflict, greater than every other maritime area on this planet.” Maximilian Hess.

The stability of army energy within the Black Sea has traditionally fluctuated between Russia and Turkey. Turkey emerged because the dominant pressure within the speedy aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The post-cold conflict interval additionally noticed shifting political alignments among the many six international locations that border the Black Sea. Bulgaria and Romania grew to become NATO allies in 2004 and EU members in 2007, whereas Turkey is an EU membership candidate and NATO ally. Within the early 2000s, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine all sought nearer alignment with the West, with all three international locations declaring an curiosity in becoming a member of the alliance.

This prompted Russia to answer the rising affect of NATO and the West within the Black Sea with challenges to those states’ sovereignty. It invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014. The annexation of Crimea led to the militarisation of the Black Sea, with Russian makes an attempt to create “no-go” zones towards NATO allies through the use of air and land-based missile programs. That militarisation allowed Russia to dominate the Black Sea till 2023, when Ukrainian assaults incapacitated virtually half of its Black Sea fleet, together with its flagship cruiser, “Moskva”. Because of this, the naval stability of energy within the Black Sea shifted once more from Russia to Turkey.

Turkey’s navy immediately is the strongest within the Black Sea, boasting superior frigates, submarines and an amphibious assault ship. This got here as a lot from the Turkish authorities’s modernisation programme over the past three a long time because the weakening of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Consistent with its pursuit of regional energy and an autonomous overseas coverage, Ankara envisioned a sturdy maritime presence to defend its pursuits in surrounding seas, together with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Dubbed the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, it aimed to reinforce Turkey’s presence in its sea areas and venture energy the place it has a army presence, resembling Somalia and Libya. The commissioning of a lightweight plane service, the TCG Anadolu, in 2023 symbolised Ankara’s dedication to enhancing its naval energy projection capabilities.

However Turkey’s Black Sea technique can be elementary to its relationship with Ukraine. The Turkish authorities has been serving to Ukraine defend itself by promoting it drones and different defence tools, and collectively producing drones. It has additionally elevated its cooperation with NATO on numerous mechanisms to assist regional stability. For instance, Turkey maintains round the clock air and naval reconnaissance missions within the Black Sea and gives as much as 67% of all situational consciousness info to NATO and Ukraine. It additionally stopped the Russian navy from passing by way of the Turkish straits, which allowed Ukraine to decimate Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet.

Turkey and Russia are neither allies nor kind an axis. Europe’s pursuits within the Black Sea thus overlap with Turkey’s: containing Russia and guaranteeing the survival of Ukraine, but additionally sustaining the independence of coastal EU member states like Romania and Bulgaria, which Russia goals to manoeuvre away from the West. However the Turkey-Russia relationship is much from easy.

Between Russia and the West

Regardless of their energy struggles in numerous areas, Ankara and Moscow have successfully compartmentalised their relations in a manner hardly ever seen in interactions between states. For instance, though they assist reverse sides in Libya, Syria and the Caucasus, Turkey and Russia have deepened their financial ties and sought mutually acceptable options by way of initiatives just like the Astana course of in Syria and the Berlin convention for a ceasefire in Libya.

Aside from a brief however harmful interval of tensions in 2015 after Turkey downed a Russian jet close to its border with Syria, the 2 governments have established a modus vivendi. On the political stage, they share a disdain for the Western-led order and recognise one another’s issues and pursuits of their neighbourhood. At a working stage, they’ve discovered a rhythm to cooperate begrudgingly.

Turkey has additionally been eager to fend off close by conflicts from spilling onto the Black Sea and guarantee freedom of navigation throughout it. At occasions, this has meant that the federal government has avoided straight difficult or scary Russia, even by stopping Western navies from coming into the Black Sea by invoking the Montreux Conference.

Nevertheless, Turkey and Russia are aligned on few points and should not have an institutional safety framework for cooperation like NATO. Their political and financial offers have been negotiated on the management stage. The federal government in Ankara views Russian expansionism as a harmful menace to its regional pursuits. In Syria, the Caucasus, Africa and Libya, the 2 compete for energy and affect.

Turkey’s warning in its dealings with Russia is undoubtedly a legacy of the Ottoman-Russian wars but additionally a mirrored image of its need to keep away from confrontation with a revisionist neighbour to the north. Because the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Turkey has prioritised preserving its delicate stability of energy with Russia over the calls for of its Western companions. For instance, when going through calls for for better NATO entry and for cooperation from European or different coastal states, like Romania or Bulgaria, Turkish officers level out that NATO is “already” within the Black Sea. One Turkish official famous at a gathering of US and European officers, “We’re already there. Aren’t we a NATO nation?”[1]

This has all contributed to Turkey’s relative estrangement from the West, and particularly the EU, over the previous decade.

The drift from the West

Apart from the problem of Russia, Europe’s leaders noticed Turkey’s assertive safety and overseas coverage in Syria, Libya and the jap Mediterranean as a problem to European pursuits. Additionally they witnessed Turkey’s democratic and human rights positive aspects backslide, that are key priorities for the EU since Turkey was nonetheless, technically talking, a candidate for membership. This all helped strip relations between Western leaders and the Turkish president all the way down to a naked minimal. Turkey’s EU accession course of was suspended for all sensible functions.

In the meantime, Turkey’s ties with the US and different key NATO companions have been lukewarm since 2015. This is because of diverging menace perceptions, differing regional insurance policies and mutual grievances. Turkey, for instance, blamed America, its most important Western ally, for a coup try towards the Turkish authorities in 2016. Certainly, a big cross-section of Turkish society noticed this as a US-backed plot. Turkish leaders additionally felt betrayed by American cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces due to the group’s affiliation with the Kurdistan Staff’ Social gathering, which has been waging an armed wrestle towards Turkey for the reason that Nineteen Eighties and is designated a terrorist group by Turkey, the EU and the US.

This divergence on Syrian Kurds additional created the temper music for nearer cooperation with Russia in Syria. In 2019, after a number of years of turmoil in Turkey-US ties, Turkey bought an S-400 missile system from Russia, triggering US sanctions on Turkey’s defence trade. Throughout 2015-2019, Turkey intervened 3 times in northern Syria to curb US-backed Kurdish teams.

Turkey had additionally been positioning its highly effective navy within the jap Mediterranean to assist its maritime claims. The rise in Turkey’s naval capability alarmed some NATO allies, notably Greece, which has longstanding maritime border disputes with Turkey within the Aegean Sea and now within the jap Mediterranean. Since 2015, successive US administrations have seen these actions with suspicion and as a departure from Turkey’s pro-Western course and its conventional position as a loyal and shut US ally, slapping Turkey with sanctions and criticism. US politicians have described Turkey as an “untrue ally” on account of its insurance policies.

Russia has benefited from Turkey’s divergence from the West. It has stuffed the European void to deepen financial cooperation, finalise the development of the TurkStream pipeline throughout the Black Sea and win the bid to construct Turkey’s first nuclear reactor—widening Turkey’s power dependency on Russia. However Turkey’s Black Sea technique additionally means it has been one in every of Ukraine’s staunchest defenders since 2022.

Defending the Black Sea (and Ukraine) since 2022

Following the all-out invasion, Turkish relations with the West improved, however solely marginally. Notably, Turkey’s determination to proceed buying and selling with Russia regardless of the invasion precipitated some consternation amongst European governments. However Turkey had been a key defence ally for Ukraine even earlier than the conflict and a pure associate in containing Russia. Ankara and Kyiv had been in discussions on deepening their defence partnership earlier than the invasion; Erdogan has lengthy supported NATO membership for Ukraine and Turkey has been lively in defending Ukraine and the remainder of the Black Sea for the reason that begin of the conflict.

Working with NATO

Turkey has cooperated with NATO since February 2022 in numerous domains, despite the fact that it has eschewed high-profile engagements to keep away from scary Russia. For instance, in June that yr Ankara assumed the command of the maritime element of NATO’s Very Excessive Readiness Joint Process Power. Its Speedy Deployable Corps, primarily based in Istanbul, then grew to become a chosen NATO Warfighting Corps in December 2022 for contingencies in 2023. This meant Turkey successfully spearheaded NATO’s response to potential additional Russian aggression towards allies.

Furthermore, in January 2024, Turkey signed an settlement with Romania and Bulgaria to set up a Mine Countermeasures Black Sea (MCM Black Sea) Process Group among the many three NATO allies to collectively sort out drifting sea mines which have threatened Black Sea transport for the reason that begin of the conflict. Turkey additionally helps NATO’s ahead presence in Romania and Bulgaria. It grew to become a contributing nation to the NATO battlegroup in Bulgaria and despatched 4 F16 plane and 80 personnel to enhance the nationwide air policing capabilities of Romania from December 2023 to March 2024. The Turkish authorities has additionally pledged to contribute to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission in Estonia in 2026. These strikes signify Turkey’s most well-liked “regional options for regional issues” method.

Arming Ukraine

Regardless of pessimistic views within the West of Kyiv’s skill to liberate all its territory, the federal government in Ankara needs Ukraine to outlive and guarantee it retains a big shoreline within the Black Sea. This implies its assist has gone past its NATO management within the Black Sea.

Turkey is dedicated to upgrading Ukraine’s army capabilities. Within the early days of the conflict, the supply of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones strengthened Ukrainian defences towards Russian makes an attempt to grab Kyiv.

The truth is, Turkey had signed a army cooperation settlement with Ukraine days earlier than Russia invaded. Turkish deliveries of extra TB2s with air-to-ground missiles shored up Ukraine’s defence earlier than Western army support arrived. Certainly, these missiles put Turkey forward of different NATO members in offering Ukraine with deadly army tools.

Turkish corporations proceed to quietly provide weapons and much-demanded ammunition to Ukraine. Turkey can be serving to Ukraine improve its maritime capabilities by constructing corvettes beneath MILGEM, Turkey’s nationwide warship-building programme.

And but, the Turkish authorities has lengthy argued that the conflict in Ukraine ought to finish sooner slightly than later—by way of negotiations—and it has been eager to play a task on this. The primary spherical of great negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in March 2022 befell in Istanbul. Two months later, Turkey brokered the “grain deal” in cooperation with the UN, which offered a mechanism in Istanbul for monitoring and vetting civilian maritime commerce. In April 2024, Turkey facilitated a prisoner change between Russia and Ukraine.

Turkey tried once more to construct on the successes of its earlier diplomacy in the summertime of 2024 when it hosted talks between Ukraine and Russia on Black Sea freedom of navigation. Turkey hoped to stretch this into a short lived moratorium on hostilities on ports and power infrastructure, Turkish and former US officers revealed to the authors following the dialogue.[2] Nevertheless, the talks got here to an finish in August 2024 with Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk area.

The West in the hunt for a Black Sea technique

Not like Turkey, till the conflict began, the EU, the US and NATO lacked a unified technique to deal with political and safety challenges within the Black Sea. Nevertheless, the full-scale invasion pressured US and European officers to contemplate a method for the area. The previous three years have underlined to Western powers how very important the Black Sea is to their strategic pursuits.

The Black Sea Safety Act was launched in each homes of the US Congress in March 2023 to finish this strategic blindness. Nonetheless, it was dominated by Ukraine-related safety points and didn’t overhaul American technique as anticipated. Equally, the EU Fee’s Black Sea Synergy doesn’t transcend a hotch-potch of environmental and social insurance policies with a nod to supporting Ukraine.

In its 2022 Strategic Idea, NATO lastly declared the Black Sea area of strategic significance, ending years of neglect, however did not go additional. This recognition has not but grow to be a complete technique that encompasses political and financial developments or features a renewed partnership with Turkey.

However with the Black Sea as the brand new centre of gravity for European safety, a longer-term strategic foresight is required for Europeans to cope with the fragmentation of energy, containment of a post-war Russia, shifts in army stability and the a number of disaster zones within the area. NATO and the EU have but to establish a coordinated Black Sea technique that’s achievable, sustainable and in a position to curb Russian overreach whereas defending the liberty of alternative for coastal states.

Another excuse for Europe to re-energise relations with Turkey is the uncertainty surrounding European safety in gentle of shifting US insurance policies. The Trump administration has signalled that Europeans should assume extra duty for his or her defence. But, even past that, US leaders appear prepared to weaponise Europe’s dependency on America for its defence and power wants. President Donald Trump already paused—then restarted, then paused, then restarted—US arms shipments to Ukraine and froze all USAID deliveries. He has additionally indicated that he’s contemplating punitive tariffs on Europe.

European-Turkish defence cooperation

Core EU member states have been sceptical about inviting Turkey right into a dialogue on the top of the conflict in Ukraine, EU defence programmes and broader European safety. However Trump’s return helps European leaders come to phrases with their shared pursuits with Turkey. In early March 2025, for instance, Turkish leaders had been invited to a pan-European summit in London to debate plans for a possible European tripwire pressure inside Ukraine to discourage additional Russian aggression within the occasion of a ceasefire. Turkey has additionally been invited to attend the EU leaders’ summit to be held in Brussels on March Twentieth-Twenty first this yr.

Over the previous three years of conflict, many European residents’ perceptions of Turkey have additionally softened.

In the meantime, Trump’s need to slap the EU with punitive tariffs whereas he pursues a reset with Putin has made clear that continued US assist for Europe’s defence is turning into politically unviable. The Trump administration would really like Europe to do extra for its personal defence. The more and more tense transatlantic relationship might deter US corporations from taking part in European defence manufacturing.

Turkey might assist fill this hole, however Europeans should overcome bilateral points that blocked better cooperation up to now. France introduced one sticking level on this regard. Over the previous decade, French-Turkish relations have been tepid due to human rights issues raised by Paris and a way of strategic rivalry that grew stronger between the 2 international locations. After the conflict in Ukraine began, French leaders argued that the EU ought to solely provide weapons to Ukraine procured from European defence corporations to assist European trade and preserve the EU’s strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, provided that the European defence trade lacks the capability to fulfill demand, France finally dropped its objections beneath stress from Ukraine and different EU member states.

Greece had additionally argued that EU cash shouldn’t be used to fund Turkish defence corporations, which, ultimately, would strengthen the Turkish army’s skill to problem European pursuits in its neighbourhood. Nevertheless, as soon as France ended its opposition, Greece additionally softened its stance.

The elimination of French objections to non-EU states and corporations tapping the European Defence Fund might result in additional entrenchment by agile Turkish defence corporations in European defence manufacturing. The producer of the profitable TB2 drones, Baykar, co-owned by Erdogan’s son-in-law, acquired the Italian firm Piaggio Aerospace in December 2024 with the intention of higher positioning itself in Europe. With regard to Black Sea safety, the EU might assist finance Turkey’s defence trade to construct ships for Romania and Bulgaria (along with Ukraine). This might strengthen EU and NATO maritime presence within the area and enhance the gross sales of Turkish defence manufacturing merchandise to international locations on the jap flank.

A number of European international locations already procure Turkish defence merchandise or cooperate with Turkish corporations of their manufacturing, together with drones, armoured automobiles and ammunition. Turkish drones have confirmed efficient in conflicts in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and the Caucasus towards Russian-built defence programs. They’re cheaper than their equivalents and include fewer—or no—restrictions.

Whereas these points go far past Black Sea safety, a reputable partnership on the defence of the Black Sea might later be developed in integrating Turkey into broader European defence initiatives, resembling Everlasting Structured Cooperation on defence.

That is exactly the form of cooperation that NATO and the EU ought to pursue with Turkey within the face of a fragmenting international order.

How Turkey, NATO and the EU can work collectively

The core rules of the transatlantic alliance are beneath menace. This presents a singular alternative to re-establish ties between Turkey and Europe round a realistic and mutually helpful collective safety partnership.

Turkey’s relationship with NATO is the central aspect of its nationwide safety id however will not be its sole pillar. Even when Turkey seeks higher relations with the West, it’ll additionally proceed to pursue an autonomous overseas and safety coverage in its neighbourhood.

Turkey and NATO

A sustainable framework for the Black Sea should stability NATO’s strategic priorities with Turkey’s regional ambitions and Russia’s persistent affect. As Ukrainian scholar Yevgeniya Gaber observes, “The advantages of retaining the Russian fleet out of the area outweigh[ed] the advantages of sending NATO warships to the Black Sea.” NATO ought to think about the next broad precept.

Preserve it regional (and low profile)

NATO ought to give attention to strengthening the navies of its coastal members (Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria) and the alliance’s companions (Ukraine and Georgia) within the Black Sea. Maritime initiatives (resembling joint naval patrols with coastal NATO international locations, bolstering Romania’s and Bulgaria’s navies, enhancing intelligence sharing and investing in maritime infrastructure) might all strengthen regional safety whereas respecting the Montreux Conference.

This might be extra conducive to a stronger partnership with Ankara than bringing extra non-coastal NATO ships into the ocean, which might not solely alienate Turkey but additionally face Montreux restrictions. Certainly, bringing in non-regional ships with out a protected harbour to withdraw to throughout moments of hazard solely will increase their vulnerability. Ukraine’s newer methods of utilizing land-based missiles and drones towards Russian warships have confirmed that the Black Sea is simply too slim to be protected for floor ships. Submarines may nonetheless be helpful, however the Montreux Conference solely permits coastal states to deliver submarines into the Black Sea.

In so doing, European NATO members must be conscious of Turkey’s regional insurance policies within the Black Sea and its technique of co-opetition with Russia. This implies the alliance ought to keep on with low-profile, regional “mini-partnerships”—with coastal members. Turkey would reply extra positively to those than high-profile cooperation with America, Britain or France. These mini-partnerships might, in flip, improve the connection between Turkey and NATO—however, because of the participation of Bulgaria and Romania, additionally the EU.

Turkey and the EU

As we speak’s Turkey is now not the identical associate that was desirous to observe the US lead or push for EU membership twenty years in the past. It’s a regional powerhouse decided to form its future in worldwide affairs, even because it veers in direction of illiberalism at dwelling. Accepting this requires the EU to change its method.

Combine defence

EU leaders ought to look to the Turkish defence trade for partnerships as member states ramp up their defences—and as Ukraine faces a conflict with “much less America”.

The Turkish authorities is especially eager to develop the position of its defence trade in assembly the EU’s new agenda for financial competitiveness and industrial manufacturing.

The EU and its member states ought to construct on their present cooperation with Turkish defence corporations. Member states resembling Poland and Italy may lead on this because of their present ties with these corporations.

Turkey’s defence manufacturing might complement Europe’s superior expertise to enhance and improve European defence industrial output and improve European safety.

Put Black Sea stability first

Ukraine’s and the EU’s speedy safety wants are urgent. However the EU must also establish different areas of mutual curiosity with Turkey and, the place potential, foster “strategic interdependence”.

The Black Sea writ giant may very well be one in every of these areas, offering a gap for the EU to determine a brand new and distinctive relationship with the Turkish authorities. This relationship might reverberate in different areas, such because the Caucasus, Central Asia and Syria, the place Europe can profit from Turkey’s attain and acquire enhanced entry to those areas.

In spite of everything, the shoreline of Crimea and Ukraine is much from the one unstable space of the Black Sea. One alternative for European-Turkish cooperation is the peace course of between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the place the 2 historic rivals have finalised, although not but signed, a peace settlement. Regardless of an EU monitoring mission and up to date European efforts to assist Armenia’s resilience and democracy, the EU lacks sustainable, long-term leverage within the Caucasus. Turkey has shut relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan and has been supportive of the peace talks, with a promise to open its land border with Armenia as soon as there’s a deal.

After a peace settlement, the EU and Turkey ought to collaborate to create a regional financial zone and a commerce route linking Europe all the best way to Central Asia (the Center Hall). This might bypass Anaklia Port in Georgia, which a Chinese language firm is constructing and can function, decreasing dangers to European provide chains from Chinese language manipulation.

In a post-Ukraine conflict situation, European policymakers ought to work with their counterparts in Ankara to strengthen joint initiatives within the wider Black Sea. For instance, they might work collectively to mitigate the results of local weather change within the area. They may additionally assist efforts to attach collectively port cities—resembling Odessa in Ukraine, Trabzon in Turkey and Varna in Bulgaria—to reinforce their desirability as main transport and tourism locations. Lastly, Turkey’s electrical and energy grids (in addition to undersea cables) may very well be used to assist the EU’s integration into regional markets across the Black Sea.

European leaders might additionally encourage Turkey to revive a few of its previous initiatives for regional safety, such because the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Process Group (BlackSeaFor)—although with out together with Russia initially—and Operation Black Sea Concord, which might strengthen sub-regional safety. Present naval cooperation towards sea mines between Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania might simply be prolonged to different pleasant international locations within the area and will cowl different areas, too.

Broaden mutual pursuits

EU policymakers must also interact with Turkey outdoors of the Black Sea. Turkey is fascinated about better cooperation on different points, together with the reconstruction of Syria, which is past the technique of Turkey. The EU, with its expertise within the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies and monetary energy, might simply associate with Turkey to assist stabilise Syria, average the insurance policies of its present rulers and improve the standard of life for extraordinary Syrians. European reconstruction funds and Turkey’s building and power sectors are equally important for Syria’s financial restoration. The eventual repatriation of Syrian refugees to their houses is one thing each Turkey and European international locations profit from and may work collectively to realize.

European leaders must also search to reinforce the EU’s place as Turkey’s prime financial associate to deliver Turkey nearer to the EU. Successive Turkish governments have sought better financial engagement with the EU and an improve to the customs union settlement. Though the European Fee agreed to this, political obstacles in Europe have blocked progress. Nonetheless, Turkey will nonetheless be looking for alternatives for engagement. It could even be prepared to alter its drumbeat of criticism of Europe to a hotter tone to enhance its ties with European international locations.

Be conscious of Turkish fears

Lastly, EU leaders needs to be delicate to Turkey’s public opinion. Turkey sees the Montreux Conference as one of many central pillars of Turkish sovereignty, so European messaging on the treaty shouldn’t problem its existence. Furthermore, European allies ought to reassure the Turkish public that it’ll not face Russia alone within the Black Sea if Turkish and European pursuits collide in one other area. The nation is simply recovering from European defence sanctions, which for a time even damage its navy as Germany stopped sending much-needed components and ammunition.

Strategic realignment with Turkey

After a decade of tumult and estrangement, better cooperation with Turkey won’t be a straightforward reconfiguration for European policymakers. A reset with Turkey has not been a subject within the inner European dialog on the way forward for Europe, its safety and even on Ukraine.

A practical relationship between Turkey and Europe would, the truth is, be a paradigm shift in Turkey-EU relations. It could open the potential for integrating Turkey into Europe’s defence posture, which might deliver immense geographic and army benefits for European safety—albeit at the price of accommodating Turkey’s warning and self-imposed restraints relating to coping with Russia.

Because the Ukraine conflict enters a essential and probably closing stage, NATO’s European allies must assume past the present army confrontation and establish areas by which Turkey can contribute to the way forward for European safety. This might contain an enhanced bodily presence in Black Sea safety, defence industrial cooperation, and, within the extra speedy time period, better Turkish-European coordination to stress Russia in direction of a simply and sturdy settlement in Ukraine.

Turkish leaders’ openness to regional cooperation with different coastal states within the Black Sea, like Romania and Bulgaria, and efforts to assist the modernisation of Ukraine’s navy, by way of arms gross sales and shipbuilding, are important components of what Black Sea safety might seem like in a post-war surroundings. Many NATO allies and companions within the Black Sea area, together with Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania, are susceptible to Russian political or army meddling. They, and wider European safety, would profit from a stronger Turkish presence within the Black Sea.

For Europe, the Black Sea mannequin gives a template of cooperation with Turkey—a NATO associate and an more and more self-confident presence. It doesn’t remedy all of Europe’s issues with Turkey, nevertheless it may very well be a superb begin.

Concerning the authors

Mustafa Aydın is professor of worldwide relations at Kadir Has College (Istanbul), president of the Worldwide Relations Council of Turkey, and coordinator of the International Academy. He’s an everyday commentator in media on international affairs and Turkish politics and has been main the yearly “Turkey Developments” survey since 2010.

Aslı Aydıntaşbaş is a senior affiliate fellow on the European Council on Overseas Relations and a visiting fellow on the Brookings Establishment in Washington, DC.  Her matters of focus embrace Turkish overseas coverage and the exterior ramifications of its home politics.

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank the Wider Europe staff at ECFR for his or her encouragement to sort out the Turkey query as soon as once more—however this time from the angle of European safety. The publications staff at ECFR has been very useful in bringing the paper to the ending line, and particular because of Jeremy Cliffe and Kim Butson. Final, however not the least, an enormous because of our editor, Kat Fytatzi, for her curiosity within the topic and for making it extra readable.

[1] Personal dialog with Turkish official in Washington DC, 2023.

[2] Personal conversations with Turkish and former US officers in Washington and Istanbul, 2024.